//,...//,... IMPORTANTE: ANTE LA POLÍTICA INCINERADORA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN Y CEMENTERAS, LA CIUDADANÍA ORGANIZADA EN LA PLATAFORMA ANDALUZA CONTRA LA INCINERACIÓN DE RESIDUOS Y POR UN AIRE LIMPIO (PACIRAL) HA ELABORADO UN PLAN ALTERNATIVO DE RESIDUOS PARA ANDALUCÍA.
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RESUMEN
Los indios americanos son el segundo grupo de inmigrantes más grande en los Estados Unidos. A medida que el número de residentes de origen indio en los Estados Unidos ha aumentado más de 4 millones, la diversidad de la comunidad también ha crecido.
Hoy en día, los indios americanos son un mosaico de recién llegados y residentes a largo plazo. Si bien la mayoría son inmigrantes, una proporción creciente nace y se cría en los Estados Unidos. Muchos inmigrantes indios podrían haber traído consigo identidades arraigadas en su patria ancestral, mientras que otros las han evitado en favor de una identidad "estadounidense" sin guiones. Y a pesar del éxito profesional, educativo y financiero general que disfrutan muchos indios americanos, esto no los ha inoculado de las fuerzas de la discriminación, la polarización y la disputa sobre cuestiones de pertenencia e identidad.
Hay sorprendentemente pocos datos sistemáticos sobre las realidades sociales cotidianas que experimentan los indios americanos. ¿Cómo perciben los indios americanos su propia identidad étnica? ¿Cómo responden a los impulsos duales de asimilación e integración? ¿Y cómo podría influir su autoconcepción en la composición de sus redes sociales?
Estas no son preguntas meramente académicas. A medida que el perfil de la comunidad indígena americana ha crecido, también lo ha hecho su influencia económica, política y social. Pero cómo los indios americanos eligen desplegar esta influencia sigue siendo una pregunta abierta. ¿Hasta qué punto las personas de origen indio se enfrentan a un comportamiento discriminatorio, por qué motivos y por quién? A medida que Estados Unidos es testigo de un resurgimiento de la violencia y el discurso de odio contra los estadounidenses de origen asiático, ¿cómo podría afectar a los estadounidenses de origen indio?
Este estudio se basa en una nueva fuente de datos empíricos para responder a estas y otras preguntas. Sus hallazgos se basan en una encuesta en línea representativa a nivel nacional de 1,200 residentes indios americanos en los Estados Unidos, la Encuesta de Actitudes de los Indios Americanos 2020 (IAAS), realizada entre el 1 y el 20 de septiembre de 2020, en asociación con la firma de investigación y análisis YouGov. La encuesta, basada tanto en ciudadanos como en no ciudadanos en los Estados Unidos, se realizó en línea utilizando el panel patentado de YouGov de 1.8 millones de estadounidenses y tiene un margen de error general de +/- 2.8 por ciento.
Este estudio es el tercero de una serie sobre las actitudes sociales, políticas y de política exterior de los indios americanos. Las principales conclusiones se resumen brevemente a continuación.
- Los indios americanos exhiben tasas muy altas de matrimonio dentro de su comunidad. Mientras que ocho de cada diez encuestados tienen un cónyuge o pareja de origen indio, los indios estadounidenses nacidos en los Estados Unidos tienen cuatro veces más probabilidades de tener un cónyuge o pareja que es de origen indio pero nació en los Estados Unidos.
- La religión juega un papel central en la vida de los indios americanos, pero la práctica religiosa varía. Mientras que casi tres cuartas partes de los indios estadounidenses afirman que la religión juega un papel importante en sus vidas, la práctica religiosa es menos pronunciada. El cuarenta por ciento de los encuestados reza al menos una vez al día y el 27 por ciento asiste a los servicios religiosos al menos una vez a la semana.
- Aproximadamente la mitad de todos los indios americanos hindúes se identifican con un grupo de castas. Los encuestados nacidos en el extranjero son significativamente más propensos que los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos a adoptar una identidad de casta. La abrumadora mayoría de los hindúes con una identidad de casta, más de ocho de cada diez, se autoidentifican como pertenecientes a la categoría de casta general o superior.
- "Indio americano" en sí mismo es una identidad disputada. Si bien el indio americano es una abreviatura comúnmente utilizada para describir a las personas de origen indio, no se acepta universalmente. Solo cuatro de cada diez encuestados creen que "indio americano" es el término que mejor captura sus antecedentes.
- El compromiso cívico y político varía considerablemente según el estado de ciudadanía. En casi todas las métricas de participación cívica y política, los ciudadanos nacidos en los Estados Unidos reportan los niveles más altos de compromiso, seguidos por los ciudadanos estadounidenses nacidos en el extranjero, con los no ciudadanos rezagados.
- Las comunidades sociales de los indios americanos están muy pobladas por otras personas de origen indio. Los indios americanos, especialmente los miembros de la primera generación, tienden a socializar con otros indios americanos. Internamente, las redes sociales de los indios americanos son más homogéneas en términos de religión que la región india (estado) de origen o casta.
- La polarización entre los indios americanos refleja tendencias más amplias en la sociedad estadounidense. Si bien la polarización religiosa es menos pronunciada a nivel individual, la polarización partidista, vinculada a las preferencias políticas tanto en la India como en los Estados Unidos, es abundante. Sin embargo, esta polarización es asimétrica: los demócratas se sienten mucho menos cómodos teniendo amigos cercanos que son republicanos que lo contrario. Lo mismo ocurre con los partidarios del Partido del Congreso frente a los partidarios del Partido Bharatiya Janata (BJP).
- Los indios americanos se enfrentan regularmente a la discriminación. Uno de cada dos indios estadounidenses informa haber sido discriminado en el último año, con la discriminación basada en el color de la piel identificada como la forma más común de sesgo. Sorprendentemente, los indios americanos nacidos en los Estados Unidos son mucho más propensos a reportar ser víctimas de discriminación que sus contrapartes nacidas en el extranjero.
- To some extent, divisions in India are being reproduced within the Indian American community. While only a minority of respondents are concerned about the importation of political divisions from India to the United States, those who are identify religion, political leadership, and political parties in India as the most common factors.
INTRODUCTION
U.S. President Joe Biden remarked in a March 2021 phone call with Swati Mohan, an Indian-origin scientist charged with overseeing the highly anticipated landing of the Perseverance Mars rover for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: “It’s amazing. Indian—of descent—Americans are taking over the country: you, my vice president [Kamala Harris, whose mother was born in India], my speechwriter, Vinay [Indian American Vinay Reddy]. . . . You guys are incredible.”1
While some in the media interpreted Biden’s off-the-cuff remark as an unfortunate gaffe, others viewed it as affirmation of the growing influence of the Indian American diaspora. In the same exchange, Biden later added: “One of the reasons why we’re such an incredible country is we’re such a diverse country. We bring the best out of every single solitary culture in the world here in the United States of America, and we give people an opportunity to let their dreams run forward.”2
These sentiments are a far cry from those expressed by a special commission established by the U.S. Congress whose 1911 report declared that Hindus were “universally regarded as the least desirable race of immigrants thus far admitted to the United States.”3 More than a century later—from Silicon Valley CEOs to White House power brokers and influential members of Congress to leaders in fields like journalism, health, science, and engineering—the emergence of the Indian diaspora is a remarkable coming-of-age story.
U.S. Census data affirm that Indian Americans enjoy a standard of living that is roughly double that of the median American household, underpinned by substantially greater educational attainment—the share of Indian Americans with at least a bachelor’s degree is twice the national average.4 However, these aggregate figures mask severe inequalities within the community. Although overall levels of poverty are lower than the American average,5 there are concentrated pockets of deprivation, especially among the large number of unauthorized immigrants born in India and residing in the United States.6
Additionally, a narrow focus on demographics such as income, wealth, education, and professional success can obscure important (and sometimes uncomfortable) social truths. What are the social realities and lived experiences of Indian Americans? How does this group perceive itself, and how does it believe others perceive it? To what extent does the community exhibit signs of shared solidarity, and are there signs of division as the group grows in number and diversity? These are some questions this paper attempts to address.
While the social realities of Indian Americans are often glossed over, recent events have brought them to the fore. In 2020, California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing filed a lawsuit against U.S.-based technology company Cisco Systems after an employee from one of India’s historically marginalized caste communities (“Dalits”) alleged that some of his upper caste Indian American colleagues discriminated against him on the basis of his caste identity.7 The suit, and subsequent media melee, triggered a wave of wrenching testimonials about the entrenched nature of caste—a marker of hierarchy and status associated with Hinduism (as well as other South Asian religions)—within the diaspora community in the United States.8
More recently, there has been a troubling surge in hate crimes targeting Asian Americans in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Indian Americans do not appear to be among the primary targets of this violence—as they were in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—the disquieting crime wave has cast a spotlight on the bigotry and violence many Asian immigrant populations experience in the United States.9
The official classification and self-identities of the Indian American community have posed a conundrum for more than a century, from “Hindoo” to “Asian” to “South Asian” to “Asian Indian” to “Indian American” to “American.” Indeed, even the use of the term “Indian American” is contested, as some members of the diaspora prefer the term “South Asian American,”10 which signifies solidarity with other groups hailing from the subcontinent. Still others reject hyphenation entirely, preferring to be known simply as “American.” For instance, former Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal declared in 2015, “I do not believe in hyphenated Americans. . . . My dad and mom told my brother and me that we came to America to be Americans. Not Indian-Americans, simply Americans.” Around the same time, Nina Davuluri (who was crowned Miss America 2014) remarked, “The fact that I am rooted in Indian culture helped me win [the] Miss America pageant.”11
How then do we make sense of the heterogeneity encapsulated by the more than 4 million people of Indian origin in the United States, a group that is the second-fastest-growing immigrant community in the country?
This study utilizes a new source of empirical data to better understand the social realities of people of Indian origin residing in the United States. Its findings are based on a nationally representative online survey of 1,200 Indian American residents in the United States—the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey (IAAS)—conducted between September 1 and September 20, 2020, in partnership with research and analytics firm YouGov. The survey, drawing on both citizens and non-citizens in the United States, was conducted online using YouGov’s proprietary panel of 1.8 million Americans and has an overall margin of error of +/- 2.8 percent.
Specifically, this study addresses seven questions concerning the social realities of Indian Americans:
- What are the demographic characteristics of Indian Americans?
- How do Indian Americans perceive their own ethnic identity and how much emphasis do they place on their “Indian-ness”?
- To what degree do Indian Americans engage with American politics, their civic community, and Indian culture?
- What do the social networks of Indian Americans look like?
- Do religious differences and partisan politics exacerbate social distance between members of the Indian American community?
- What are Indian Americans’ experiences with discrimination, and how do discriminatory practices manifest?
- How do Indian Americans relate to the Indian American community writ large?
This study is the third in a series of empirical papers on the Indian American community. The first, released in October 2020, explored the political attitudes and preferences of Indian Americans in advance of the November 2020 U.S. presidential election.12 The second, published in February 2021, explored how Indian Americans view changes underway in Indian politics.13
SURVEY OVERVIEW
Indian Americans are the second-largest immigrant group in the United States.14
According to data from the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS)—which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau—there are 4.2 million people of Indian origin residing in the United States. Although a large proportion are not U.S. citizens (38 percent), roughly 2.6 million are (1.4 million are naturalized citizens and 1.2 million were born in the United States).
The data for this study are based on an original online survey—the IAAS—of 1,200 Indian American U.S. residents conducted by YouGov between September 1 and September 20, 2020. The IAAS sample includes both citizens and non-U.S. citizens; the former category accounts for 77 percent of the survey respondents. Table 1 provides a demographic profile of the IAAS sample in comparison to the Indian American sample in the 2018 ACS.
YouGov recruited respondents from its proprietary panel comprising 1.8 million U.S. residents. Only adult respondents (ages eighteen and above) who identified as Indian American or a person of (Asian) Indian origin were able to participate in the survey. YouGov employs a sophisticated sample matching procedure to ensure that the respondent pool is representative of the Indian American community in the United States, using data from the ACS as a target sample frame. All the analyses in this study employ sampling weights to ensure representativeness.15
The overall margin of error for the IAAS is +/- 2.8 percent. This margin of error is calculated at the 95 percent confidence interval. Further methodological details can be found in Appendix A, along with a state-wise map of survey respondents.
The survey instrument contains 157 questions organized across six modules: basic demographics; immigration, citizenship, and family background; presidential campaigns and voting; U.S. politics and foreign policy; culture and social behavior; and Indian politics. Respondents were allowed to skip questions save for important demographic questions that determined the nature of other survey items. All attitudinal and perceptual measures and variables discussed in this paper are self-reported measures by respondents. For complete survey topline results, please visit Appendix B online.
KEY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN AMERICANS
This section provides a snapshot of the Indian American population in the United States, as captured by the IAAS. It covers five broad areas: citizenship and residency status; educational attainment; marital status; Indian region of origin; and religion, religious practice, and caste identity.
CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCY STATUS
As table 1 indicates, 77 percent of IAAS respondents are U.S. citizens, although there is significant variation within that category.16 Thirty-nine percent of all respondents immigrated to the United States and later became naturalized U.S. citizens. Thirty-three percent were born in the United States but with at least one parent who was born outside of the United States. Another 4 percent were born in the United States to parents also born in the United States. The remaining 23 percent of the sample consists of immigrants residing in the United States who do not hold U.S. citizenship.
Not surprisingly, of the non-U.S. citizen population, 88 percent of IAAS respondents claim Indian citizenship. But members of this group exhibit significant variation in terms of their visa status (see figure 1).
Thirty percent of non-citizen IAAS respondents possess a green card (or a permanent residency card), which places them on a pathway to gaining U.S. citizenship. Twenty-seven percent are H-1B visa holders, a visa status for high-skilled or specialty workers in the United States that has historically been dominated by the technology sector. On average, an H-1B visa holder reports living in the United States for eight years, although 36 percent of H-1B beneficiaries report spending more than a decade in the country (that is, they arrived before 2010). Eighteen percent of non-citizens reside in the United States on an H-4 visa, a category for immediate family members of H-1B visa holders. Fourteen percent of non-citizens are on F-1, J-1, or M-1 visas—categories of student or scholar visas—while another 5 percent hold an L-1 visa, a designation available to employees of an international company with offices in the United States. A small minority of non-citizen respondents—6 percent—claim some other visa status.
Of the non-citizen population residing in the United States, the survey finds that 80 percent of them would accept U.S. citizenship if offered—an important preference given that Indian law forbids dual citizenship.
For those respondents who immigrated to the United States, over half (60 percent) arrived in the year 2000 or after (see figure 2).17 Seventeen percent arrived in the 1990s, 13 percent immigrated in the 1980s, and just 10 percent arrived before the year 1980. There is a similar trend in naturalization for those who immigrated and later took U.S. citizenship. Sixty-four percent of this subset of respondents were naturalized after the year 2000, while the remainder received U.S. citizenship before that.
The Government of India maintains an Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) designation for persons of Indian origin residing abroad who do not hold Indian citizenship. OCI status effectively functions as a lifetime visa and also grants recipients the ability to live and work in India on a permanent basis. Forty-two percent of respondents who are not Indian citizens have taken advantage of the program.18
Of course, many Indian Americans—irrespective of citizenship—remain tied to India thanks to direct family connections. At the time of the survey, more than half (55 percent) of Indian Americans reported that they had an immediate family member (spouse, mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter) currently residing in India.
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
The survey also asks respondents about their educational attainment, which provides insight into the socioeconomic profile of Indians in America.
Overall, the Indian American population is highly educated compared to the U.S. average (see figure 3), as other studies have suggested.19 Nearly three-fourths have a college education—40 percent of respondents have completed a postgraduate education and another 33 percent have finished four years of undergraduate study. Four percent have completed at least a junior college (two-year program) education, while 9 percent have completed some college. Thirteen percent have a high school diploma and just 1 percent have not finished high school.
These numbers are actually a lower bound of Indian Americans’ educational attainment. Many respondents are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five and, thus, are plausibly in the middle of their educational training. If one restricts attention to respondents aged twenty-five and older, nearly 80 percent have either a college or postgraduate degree (compared to 73 percent in the overall sample).
In all, 52 percent of Indians in America completed their education in the United States. Of that segment that was educated abroad, 42 percent arrived in the United States with an undergraduate degree and another 38 percent had completed a graduate or professional degree before their arrival. Eleven percent finished high school elsewhere, while only 8 percent had less than a high school education. These data suggest that the vast majority of the Indian immigrant population in the United States were already highly educated prior to arriving in the country.
MARITAL STATUS
Los indios americanos exhiben altas tasas de matrimonio y bajas tasas de divorcio. Los datos de la ACS muestran que la proporción de hogares de parejas casadas en la comunidad es un 50 por ciento mayor que el promedio de los Estados Unidos.20 En la muestra de IAAS, el 66 por ciento de los encuestados estaban casados o en una pareja de hecho.
La investigación existente ha encontrado que entre las principales comunidades asiático-americanas, los indios americanos, tanto hombres como mujeres, tienen la tasa más alta de endogamia (la costumbre de casarse dentro de la comunidad) tanto en la primera como en la segunda generación, aunque hay un aumento notable en el matrimonio fuera de la comunidad entre los miembros de la segunda generación.21
Los datos de IAAS confirman este hallazgo. Ocho de cada diez encuestados dicen que tienen un cónyuge o pareja de origen indio (que van desde el 85 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en el extranjero hasta el 71 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos).
La etiqueta "origen indio" en sí misma enmascara la variación en términos del lugar de nacimiento. La Figura 4 desentraña esto más a fondo y analiza tres categorías de cónyuges o parejas: origen indio pero nacidos en la India; De origen indio pero nacido en los Estados Unidos; y de origen no indio. Las respuestas se desglosan por lugar de nacimiento de los encuestados.
Como lo demuestra la cifra, los indios estadounidenses nacidos en el extranjero son significativamente más propensos a tener un cónyuge o pareja que es de origen indio y nacido en la India. El setenta y siete por ciento de los indios estadounidenses nacidos en el extranjero caen en esta categoría, en comparación con solo el 40 por ciento de los indios estadounidenses nacidos en los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, en comparación con sus contrapartes nacidas en el extranjero, los indios estadounidenses nacidos en los Estados Unidos tienen cuatro veces más probabilidades de informar tener un cónyuge o pareja que es de origen indio pero nacido en los Estados Unidos (31 por ciento frente al 8 por ciento). Finalmente, los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos también son significativamente más propensos a informar que tienen un cónyuge o pareja que no es de origen indio: el 29 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos en comparación con solo el 15 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en el extranjero.
En general, el 19 por ciento de los encuestados informan tener un cónyuge que no es de origen indio, pero esto es un poco más común entre los hombres (22 por ciento) que entre las mujeres (16 por ciento). Curiosamente, entre los encuestados nacidos en el extranjero, el doble de hombres (20 por ciento) tienen un cónyuge de origen no indio en comparación con las mujeres (10 por ciento), pero la brecha desaparece con creces entre los nacidos en los Estados Unidos: mientras que el 27 por ciento de los hombres tienen un cónyuge de origen no indio, esto se eleva al 31 por ciento entre las mujeres.
REGIÓN DE ORIGEN
Con el fin de discernir la región de origen de los encuestados de IAAS, la encuesta pregunta si identifican uno o más estados de la India como su(s) estado(s) de origen. Sesenta y cuatro por ciento de los encuestados llaman a un solo estado su estado de origen, mientras que el 12 por ciento se identifica con varios estados de origen. Casi uno de cada cuatro encuestados no reporta ningún apego particular a un estado de origen.
Figure 5 maps respondents’ states of origin in India. In cases where the respondent identifies with multiple states, both states are counted as a home state. (Hence, the percentages do not add up to 100.) The western state of Gujarat emerges as the most common home state, with 14 percent of respondents calling it their home, followed by Maharashtra (12 percent), Andhra Pradesh (10 percent), and Tamil Nadu (9 percent). Other popular home states include Delhi (9 percent), Punjab (8 percent), and Kerala (7 percent).
Another way of examining respondents’ regional connections in India is to look at their linguistic backgrounds. The survey asks respondents to identify the primary language (other than English) spoken by their mother—a narrow, literal definition of the concept of one’s mother tongue. Table 2 presents results of the most common languages among respondents, restricting attention to languages identified by at least 2 percent of respondents. The ordering in table 2 roughly corresponds with the map shown below.
Overall, Hindi is the most common mother tongue (19 percent), followed by Gujarati (14 percent), English only (10 percent), and Telugu (10 percent)—the latter is the primary language of the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.22 Eight percent of respondents report Tamil as their mother tongue, while 7 percent apiece report Punjabi or Bengali. Malayalam (6 percent), Urdu (5 percent), Marathi (4 percent), and Kannada (3 percent) round out the list. The balance (around 7 percent) consists of less frequently listed languages, ranging from Sindhi to Santali.
RELIGION, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, AND CASTE
RELIGION
According to IAAS data, 54 percent of respondents report belonging to the Hindu faith (see figure 6). The next most common response—those claiming no religious affiliation (a category that includes agnostics and atheists)—accounts for 16 percent of the sample. Thirteen percent of respondents are Muslim, 11 percent are Christian, and another 7 percent belong to a variety of other faiths including Buddhism and Sikhism. In certain cases, these larger groupings consist of smaller denominations that have been aggregated upward.
In addition to asking respondents about their religious identity, the survey also asks them about the role religion plays in their life. This emulates a standard set of survey questions that has long been asked by the Pew Research Center.23
When asked how important religion is in their life, 72 percent of respondents reply that religion is either very important or somewhat important. This statistic is nearly identical to the average of the American population at large. According to a 2019 Pew survey, 70 percent of Americans said religion is very important or somewhat important in their lives.24 Notably, responses to this question in the IAAS sample do not vary greatly by place of birth; respondents born in the United States are nearly as likely to report that religion is important to them as those born outside of the country.
There does appear to be some variation based on respondents’ religious identity (see figure 7). Muslims and Christians are significantly more likely than Hindus to say that religion is very important to them—a gap of nearly 30 percentage points. Hindus, in turn, are much more likely than Christians or Muslims to state that religion is somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important in their lives.
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
In terms of attending religious services, there is also significant variation within the Indian American community. Twenty-seven percent of respondents report that they attend religious services (apart from weddings and funerals) once a week or more than once a week. This is identical to the share of all Americans who report attending services at least once a week, based on a 2020 Pew survey.25 Forty percent, the modal category, of Indian Americans report attending religious services once or twice a month or just a few times a year. Another 31 percent report little or no participation in religious services, claiming they do so seldom or never.
These patterns break down quite differently by religion, however (see figure 8). Christians are the most observant group as far as attending religious services is concerned. Fifty-eight percent of Christians report attending church at least once or several times per week. Nearly half of all Muslims (48 percent) say they attend religious services regularly as well. This proportion declines dramatically for Hindus, with only 21 percent reporting regularly attending religious services. A majority of Hindus (52 percent) report attending religious services once or twice a month or just a few times a year, while another 25 percent report seldom or never attending religious services.
Apart from attending religious services, the survey asks respondents how frequently they pray (outside of the times they attend religious services). Forty percent of respondents report praying either several times a day or once a day—significantly more than the 27 percent of the sample that attends religious services at least once a week. The share of Indian Americans who pray either several times a day or once a day is slightly below the U.S. average (46 percent according to Pew survey data).26 Another 20 percent of Indian Americans report taking part in prayer a few times a week or once a week, while 11 percent pray at least a few times a month. Twenty-four percent of Indian Americans report seldom or never praying.
Clear differences along religious lines are evident in the responses to the question on the frequency of prayer (see figure 9). Not only are Hindus less likely to report attending religious services, but they are also less likely to say that they pray. Forty percent of Hindus say they pray once or several times a day—substantially less than the 58 percent of Muslims or 66 percent of Christians who answer similarly. Hindus are also more likely than Muslims or Christians to state that they pray a few times a month, seldom, or never.27
Caste
Finally, the survey explores the issue of caste. Caste has long been a sensitive and controversial issue in discussions about the Indian American community. Media reports about caste discrimination in the technology hub of Silicon Valley—where a large number of Indian Americans are employed—and a heated controversy over whether caste should be a part of history textbooks in the state of California have brought the issue to the forefront once more.28 A 2018 survey of 1,500 South Asian Americans found that many low-caste members of numerous diaspora communities had endured firsthand experience of caste discrimination. However, the study is not based on a representative sample, raising questions about the generalizability of its findings.29
While caste is most commonly associated with Hinduism, caste hierarchies and caste self-identification are prevalent in most, if not all, of India’s major religions. For instance, the category Other Backward Classes (OBC) is common among Muslims, while Scheduled Castes or Dalits can also be found in Buddhist, Sikh, Christian, and Muslim communities. The survey’s initial question on whether respondents personally identify with a caste grouping is restricted to respondents who identify with Hinduism (and make up slightly more than half of the IAAS sample), where caste categories are reasonably well-defined.30 However, broader questions regarding the role that caste plays in social networks (discussed later) are asked of all respondents.
Forty-seven percent of Hindu respondents report identifying with a caste, which means the majority (53 percent) said that they do not personally identify with a caste group of any kind. However, there is marked variation by place of birth. Whereas 53 percent of foreign-born Hindu Indian Americans affiliate with a caste group, 34 percent of U.S.-born Hindu Indian Americans do the same. There is no variation at all based on duration of stay in the United States. Hindus who recently arrived in the United States are just as likely to identify with a caste group as those who have been here for a quarter-century or more.31
Overall, there are 632 respondents in the IAAS sample who belong to the Hindu faith but only 293 who report identifying with a caste group. Of this latter group, the overwhelming majority—83 percent—categorize themselves as General or upper caste. Sixteen percent identify as a member of OBC and 1 percent each identify as Adivasi/Scheduled Tribe (ST) or Dalit/Scheduled Caste (SC).
One should treat these findings with caution. First, as noted above, the data on caste identification is restricted to Hindu respondents. Therefore, the sample size from which these percentages is derived is small—just one-half of the overall IAAS sample. Second, given the presence of SCs among some non-Hindu religious groups, it is likely that the absolute number of SCs—if not the percentage—in the IAAS sample is higher. Finally, given the sensitive nature of caste identity, nonresponses in the survey could mask those who do not wish to disclose their caste affiliation even if they are aware of their family’s caste identity.
INDIAN (AND AMERICAN) IDENTITIES
In order to be eligible to serve as a respondent for the IAAS, members of YouGov’s panel must self-identify as a person of (Asian) Indian origin who resides in the United States. But self-identification as a person of Indian origin tells us little about the strength of a respondent’s Indian identity. This section explores how Indian Americans view the subject of their own identity.
IMPORTANCE OF BEING INDIAN
First, the survey asked respondents how important being Indian is to their identity. Overall, 41 percent of respondents rate it as very important and another 37 percent rate it as somewhat important. Taken together, more than three-quarters of Indian Americans place a high value on their “Indian-ness.” Around 22 percent state that their Indian identity is either somewhat or very unimportant.32
One might expect, however, that the importance of a respondent’s Indian identity might vary by their place of birth. For instance, it is plausible that Indian Americans born in the United States would place less emphasis on their “Indian-ness” than their counterparts who immigrated. In fact, that is precisely what the data suggest (see figure 10).
Eighty-three percent of foreign-born Indian Americans claim being Indian is either very or somewhat important to their identity, compared to 70 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans. The differences are most pronounced among those who say being Indian is very important to them. On the other end of the spectrum, 30 percent of Indian Americans born in the United States answer that being Indian is either somewhat or very unimportant to their identity—a response given by just 17 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans.
There is some evidence to suggest that there are “vintage” effects: the longer a respondent has spent in the United States, the less emphasis they place on their Indian identity—perhaps a reflection of their gradual integration into their adopted homeland. However, the magnitude of the effect is modest. Fifty percent of respondents who have been in the United States for ten years or less say that being Indian is very important to their identity, compared to 42 percent for those who have been in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Indian Americans in this latter category are also more inclined to state that being Indian is somewhat or very unimportant to them.33 Respondents who identify as Republicans are also significantly less likely to place importance on the “Indian-ness” of their identity compared to Democrats or independents.
Religious affiliation too correlates with one’s feelings toward their Indian identity. Eighty-eight percent of Hindus say being Indian is very or somewhat important to them, compared to 79 percent of Christians and 66 percent of Muslims. This is possibly a reflection of India’s current political climate. The February 2021 IAAS paper found that almost seven in ten Hindus approve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s performance, while just one in five Muslims feel the same.34 However, without longitudinal data, it is unclear to what extent the religious divide reflects the specificities of the current context—in which Muslims in India feel especially marginalized and discriminated against—or is instead a product of longer-term trends.
SELF-IDENTIFICATION
The variation in respondents’ feelings of “Indian-ness” begs the question of how Indian Americans navigate multiple identities linked both to their country of origin as well as their country of settlement.
The IAAS asks respondents how they self-identify; after all, identities are liminal and individuals might identify with any number of identity categories. To probe this issue, the survey provides respondents with eight identity categories and asks them which of the following best describes their background. The results are displayed in figure 11.
Interestingly, while three-fourths of respondents identify with an “Indian” nomenclature, this masks exactly how that term is used. Only 43 percent of IAAS respondents believe that “Indian American” is the term that best captures their background. One-quarter of all respondents self-identify as “Indian” while 7 percent choose the term “Asian Indian.”
Ten percent of IAAS respondents identify as “South Asian American,” a term which refers to diaspora populations from countries across the region such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Six percent choose no hyphenation at all and identify only as “American” and another 6 percent classify themselves as “Asian American,” an identity category that includes a wide range of diaspora groups from the Asian continent. Two percent of respondents identify as “Other,” indicating that none of the declared options satisfy them, while just 1 percent identify as “Non-resident Indian,” the official appellation used by the Government of India to refer to Indian passport holders living outside of India.
As one might expect, first-generation (foreign-born) and second-generation (U.S.-born) respondents approach this question differently (see figure 12). Indian Americans who are born in the United States are more likely to identify as Indian American (48 to 40 percent) and markedly less likely to identify as Indian (just 11 percent compared to 33 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans). Conversely, second-generation Indian Americans born in the United States are more likely to embrace the terms South Asian American, Asian American, and the nonhyphenated American.
Self-identification also varies by religion. While 86 percent of Hindus report identifying with some kind of “Indian” identity, 71 percent of Christians and 52 percent of Muslims do the same. Relative to Muslims, Christians and Hindus are equally likely to self-identify as “Indian American” (47 percent each versus 32 percent for Muslims), and Hindus are substantially more likely to self-identify as “Indian” (32 percent versus 17 percent for Christians and 12 percent for Muslims). On the other hand, Muslims are much more likely to self-identify as “South Asian” (27 percent compared to 7 percent of Christians and 5 percent of Hindus). Finally, Christians are more likely to self-identify as “American” without any hyphenation (9 percent versus 6 percent for Muslim and 4 percent for Hindus).
The length of one’s stay in the United States also plays an important role in shaping self-identification. Just 24 percent of Indian Americans who have lived in the United States between one and ten years identify as Indian American, compared to 41 percent of those who have been here for eleven to twenty-five years and 53 percent of those who have been here for more than twenty-five years. The reverse is true when it comes to identifying as “Indian”: the majority of Indian Americans who have lived in the United States between one and ten years (54 percent) feel most comfortable with this term, while that share declines to just 21 percent for those here for more than twenty-five years.
NAVIGATING MULTIPLE IDENTITIES
Although “Indian American” is a contested category, the survey attempts to understand how respondents perceive the push and pull between different aspects of their identity. For instance, do respondents feel more Indian than American, more American than Indian, equally Indian and American, or neither Indian nor American?
According to the data, the modal response of Indian Americans is that they weigh the two sides of their identity equally: 45 percent feel equally Indian and American. Thirty-one percent state that they feel more American than Indian and 19 percent state the converse—that they feel more Indian than American. A very small proportion, just 5 percent, state that they feel neither Indian nor American.
Predictably, responses vary by place of birth (see figure 13). Indeed, a plurality (44 percent) of Indian Americans born in the United States say that they feel more American than Indian (compared to 23 percent of foreign-born respondents). At the other end of the spectrum, 24 percent of foreign-born respondents feel more Indian than American, a sentiment shared by just 11 percent of their U.S.-born counterparts.
Interestingly, those born outside of the United States are most likely to say that they feel equally Indian and American—nearly one in two fall into this category (as do 38 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans).35 A slightly higher share of U.S.-born Indian Americans (7 percent) than foreign-born Indian Americans (4 percent) claim that they feel neither Indian nor American.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
This section reviews two aspects of the social context within which Indian Americans operate. The first part looks at three types of engagement: civic, political, and cultural. The second part examines the social networks of Indians in America and how they vary by respondents’ demographic characteristics.
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
The survey asks respondents whether—in the past one year—they participated in any of four common methods of civic engagement: working with others in their community to solve a problem; performing voluntary community service without pay; attending a public meeting, such as for a school board or city council; or attending a protest march, demonstration, or rally. The most common activity is performing community service, something 20 percent of respondents engaged in, followed by working with others in their community (15 percent), attending a public meeting (13 percent), and attending a protest or demonstration (11 percent).
Figure 14 disaggregates the results by place of birth and citizenship status. Respondents are classified as belonging to one of three categories: U.S.-born citizen, foreign-born citizen, and non-citizen. U.S.-born citizens report the highest levels of civic engagement, followed by foreign-born citizens and, in all categories save for one, non-citizens report the lowest levels of civic engagement.
A much higher share of U.S.-born citizens report attending a protest (18 percent) than either foreign-born citizens (8 percent) or non-citizens (4 percent). Seventeen percent of U.S.-born citizens report attending a public meeting, while 12 percent of foreign-born citizens and 6 percent of non-citizens report doing so. Community service is the most popular form of civic engagement for Indian Americans of all types. Twenty-six percent of U.S.-born citizens report taking part in voluntary service compared to 18 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of non-citizens.
The one slight deviation in the overall pattern of civic engagement is found in the final category—working with others in your community to solve a problem. Once more, U.S.-born citizens lead the pack with 22 percent of them reporting participation in this activity. However, non-citizens are about as likely as foreign-born citizens to engage in the resolution of community issues (12 percent versus 11 percent).
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
The survey also queries respondents about whether they participated, over the past twelve months, in any of five political activities: volunteering or working on a political campaign; posting comments online about politics; discussing politics with friends and family; contributing money to a candidate, party, or campaign organization; or contacting their elected representative or another government official.
Nearly one in two respondents (45 percent) report discussing politics in the past year—by far the most common activity. Twenty-one percent report posting comments about political issues online. Contributing financially to campaigns (14 percent), contacting an elected representative or government official (12 percent), and volunteering on a political campaign (9 percent) are less popular activities.36
As with civic engagement, U.S.-born citizens are the most engaged, followed by foreign-born citizens and non-citizens (see figure 15). This finding tracks with other studies of immigrant communities.37
When it comes to discussing politics with family and friends, there are only small differences across citizenship status. Forty-seven percent of U.S.-born citizens report engaging in this activity, but 45 percent of foreign-born citizens and 41 percent of non-citizens did so as well. When it comes to online discussions of politics, 28 percent of U.S.-born citizens posted comments about political issues on an online forum, compared to 18 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of non-citizens.
On the matter of campaign finance, one-fifth of U.S.-born citizens report contributing to a political campaign, while just 13 percent of foreign citizens and 5 percent of non-citizens said they did so. The low rate of political giving for non-citizens is expected given that non-citizens are forbidden from making political donations unless they are permanent residents (that is, they possess a green card). Relatively few Indian Americans across the board report contacting an elected representative or other government official: 15 percent of U.S.-born citizens, 11 percent of foreign-born citizens, and 9 percent of non-citizens engaged in this class of activities. Finally, volunteering or working on a political campaign appears to be the least common form of political engagement. Unsurprisingly, just 4 percent of non-citizens participated in this activity, while 8 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of U.S.-born citizens reported working on a campaign.
It is worth pointing out that nearly one-third (32 percent) of respondents report not engaging in any of the civic or political activities listed on the survey. However, non-citizens and foreign-born citizens report nonparticipation at roughly twice the rate of U.S.-born citizens: 47 and 41 percent, respectively, compared to 22 percent of U.S.-born citizens.
CULTURAL ENGAGEMENT
The February 2021 IAAS study examined the degree to which Indian Americans remain connected to India through cultural outlets such as Indian food, movies or television, and art, dance, or music.38 This paper looks at one additional aspect of cultural engagement: participation in select holidays regularly celebrated in India.
The survey asks respondents whether they participate in a set of holidays, some associated with India and others that are either associated with the United States or are more global in nature. Interestingly, among IAAS respondents, Diwali emerges as the most celebrated holiday—63 percent of respondents report that they celebrate the Indian festival of lights (see figure 16). U.S. Independence Day (July 4) ranks second (57 percent), followed by Christmas (54 percent). Given the relatively small share of Christians in the Indian American community, this suggests that Christmas is celebrated more on cultural than religious grounds. Rounding out the list, 41 percent report celebrating Holi (the Indian festival of colors that traditionally marks the beginning of Spring), 39 percent celebrate Valentine’s Day, 35 percent mark Indian Independence Day (August 15), and 20 percent commemorate Eid. Fewer than one in ten respondents (9 percent) do not participate in any of these seven holidays.
Foreign-born Indian Americans are much more likely to commemorate Diwali, Holi, and Indian Independence Day than respondents born in the United States. The differences are especially stark for Diwali and Indian Independence Day, where the gap between the two groups is on the order of 20 percentage points. There is also important variation by one’s religious identity. Diwali and Holi are largely celebrated by Hindus, while very few non-Muslims commemorate Eid. Interestingly, more than half of all Hindu respondents (56 percent) celebrate Christmas compared to just one in five Muslim respondents.
SOCIAL NETWORKS
This section reviews some basic characteristics of the social networks of Indian Americans. The objective of this inquiry is to assess to what extent Indian Americans associate with other Indian Americans relative to those from outside the community.
SOCIAL CIRCLES
The IAAS asks respondents, “Which of the following best describes your personal group of friends?” Respondents choose from a list of five possible responses (not counting “don’t know”): that all, most, some, very few, or none of their friends are of Indian origin.
The modal response—selected by 38 percent of respondents—is that some of their friends are of Indian origin. Thirty-six percent report that either all or most of their friends are of Indian origin, while 21 percent report that very few or none of their friends are of Indian origin. Five percent responded “don’t know.” Overall, the distribution is skewed in favor of a social network populated with relatively more people of Indian origin.
Por supuesto, es probable que la composición de las redes sociales de uno se vea afectada por su ubicación. A medida que aumenta el número y / o la concentración de indios americanos en una geografía, uno podría esperar que las redes sociales de los encuestados se vuelvan más insulares. Por ejemplo, las redes sociales de un indio americano en Wyoming (donde hay muy pocos indios americanos) probablemente estarán dominadas por no indios americanos. Pero en Nueva Jersey, donde hay una concentración significativa de indios americanos, los indios americanos son más propensos a asociarse con los suyos.
De hecho, la encuesta encuentra que en los condados con más hogares indio-americanos, los encuestados son significativamente más propensos a decir que sus redes sociales están dominadas por otros indios americanos (ver figura 17).39 Este efecto parece ser aproximadamente lineal, aunque hay un fuerte aumento una vez que más del 5 por ciento de los hogares en un condado son indios americanos.
Como era de esperar, la composición de las redes sociales de los encuestados varía según su lugar de nacimiento. Como muestra la figura 18, el 43 por ciento de los indios estadounidenses nacidos en el extranjero tienen una red social dominada por amigos de origen indio, en comparación con el 25 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos (sumando las acciones de aquellos que dicen que todos o la mayoría de sus amigos son de origen indio). Sin embargo, es más probable que los indios estadounidenses nacidos en los Estados Unidos denuncien una red social con un número limitado de indios (afirmando que muy pocos o ninguno de sus amigos son de origen indio) o que tomen el término medio: el 42 por ciento de ellos informa que algunos de sus amigos son de origen indio, en comparación con el 35 por ciento de los encuestados nacidos en el extranjero.40
DIVERSIDAD EN LAS REDES INDIO-AMERICANAS
La homofilia, la tendencia de los individuos a asociarse con personas similares a ellos mismos, es un fuerte determinante de las redes sociales.41 Pero, ¿qué dimensión (religión, región de origen o casta) impulsa las asociaciones de uno? La encuesta hace una pregunta de seguimiento a los encuestados que informan que tienen amigos de origen indio (de toda la muestra de 1,200 encuestados, 1,093 caen en esta categoría): "Entre sus amigos de origen indio, cuántos a) pertenecen a la misma religión que usted; b) son de la misma región de la India que usted; y c) son de la misma casta que tú?" El propósito de esta pregunta es investigar si las redes sociales de origen indio son internamente homogéneas o heterogéneas.
La Figura 19 muestra las respuestas a esta pregunta, colapsando cinco categorías de respuesta en tres para facilitar la exposición. Parece que las redes sociales de los encuestados son más homogéneas en términos de religión que la región o la casta. Cuarenta y ocho por ciento de los encuestados informan que la mayoría o todos sus amigos indios comparten su fe religiosa, mientras que otro 36 por ciento informa que algunos de sus amigos son correligionarios. Solo el 12 por ciento informa que casi ninguno o ninguno de sus amigos comparte la religión del encuestado.
In contrast, there is more variation on the dimensions of region and caste. Twenty-nine percent of respondents report that most or all of their friends are from the same region of India. Forty-three percent report that some are, while 23 percent say that hardly any or none are. The pattern is similar when it comes to caste, although nearly one-quarter of respondents claim they do not know what share of their friends belong to their caste group, suggesting that caste is a less salient category for a significant segment of IAAS respondents.
Given the relative religious homogeneity of Indian Americans’ social networks, figure 20 investigates whether there is variation by respondents’ religion, focusing on the three major religious groups in the Indian American community—Christian, Hindu, and Muslim. Several interesting patterns emerge from this breakdown.
First, Hindus are more likely to report that most or all of their Indian friends are also Hindus, underscoring a greater degree of religious homogeneity in their social networks. Fifty-eight percent of Hindus respond in this way, while 48 and 46 percent of Muslims and Christians, respectively, report that their networks are comprised of those of the same religion. Second, around one-third of Christians and Hindus and two-fifths of Muslims are situated in the middle, reporting that some of their Indian American networks are made up of friends of the same religion. Third, Christians are much more likely to report that hardly any or none of their Indian friends share their religion. Nearly one in five (19 percent) identify this way, compared to 10 percent of Muslims and only 6 percent of Hindus.
The smaller the size of a given group, the fewer opportunities individuals have of meeting someone from their same group. Conversely, the larger the size of a group, the greater the likelihood of meeting someone from that group. Given that there are many more Indian Americans who are Hindu in the IAAS sample—and the fact that nearly half of Christians and Muslims report that all or most of their friends share their religion—this means that both Christians and Muslims have substantially more religious homophily, relative to Hindus.
Figure 21 looks more closely at the caste composition of social networks among Hindus. Seventy-four percent of Hindu respondents who report not identifying with a caste nevertheless know enough to be able to identify the caste identities of their social networks. Only 26 percent of Hindus who do not identify with a caste respond to questions about the caste composition of their social networks by answering “don’t know.” This indicates that even though a large proportion of Hindu respondents say they do not identify with a caste, only a small fraction are unaware of the caste composition of their networks.
What is also striking is how relatively small the differences are between respondents who identify with a caste versus those who do not. While the former report that a slightly higher share of their social network comprises people of the same caste, if one sets aside the “don’t know” responses, the relative differences between caste identifiers and non-identifiers is marginal. For instance, 27 percent of Hindu respondents who identify with a caste report that all or most of their Indian friends share their caste affiliation. Nineteen percent of those who do not identify with a caste group answer similarly. Respondents who acknowledge a caste identity are only slightly more likely to report that some of their social network is made up of people of the same caste (41 percent versus 33 percent for those without a caste identity).
SOCIAL DISTANCE
The previous section demonstrated that, for many Indian Americans, shared religious affiliation is the most important characteristic of respondents’ social networks. This could be the result of circumstance and context, or it could be the product of social distance—the relative distance that one feels toward members of an out-group (religious, ethnic, partisan, and so on) relative to members of one’s own in-group.
Questions that measure social distance are often used to understand the salience of group identity and perceptions of group hierarchy, and as a basis of prediction of inter-group prejudice. The IAAS draws on a series of questions adapted from the political science literature in order to measure inter-group social distance in the Indian American community.42 Namely, the survey explores how Indian Americans feel about having close interactions with out-group members along two prominent cleavages: those who are of a different religion, or who carry a different partisan affiliation. The examination of partisanship, in turn, further distinguishes between partisan support in India and in the United States.43
RELIGION
To measure interreligious social distance, the survey asks respondents how comfortable they would be having close friends that are Hindu or Muslim. Respondents can select from one of three responses: very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, or not comfortable. The results are shown in figure 22.
As one might expect, both Hindus and Muslims are overwhelmingly comfortable having close friends who share their faith: 97 percent of Hindu respondents report being very or somewhat comfortable having close Hindu friends, and 96 percent of Muslims report the same.
However, Hindus and Muslims exhibit less comfort when it comes to having close friends of the opposite faith. Overall, 89 percent of Hindus and Muslims apiece report they are very or somewhat comfortable having friends of the other faith. However, the major distinction has to do with the intensity of this feeling, exemplified by the sharp difference in the share of respondents who report being very comfortable with friends of the opposite faith: 52 percent of Hindus are very comfortable having close Muslim friends, while 46 percent of Muslims are very comfortable having close Hindu friends. There are, consequently, a large share of respondents who are only somewhat comfortable having close friends of the opposite faith. Christians, whose views are represented in the bottom two horizontal bars of figure 22, hold roughly similar attitudes toward both Hindus and Muslims.
PARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES
Given the degree of partisan polarization present in U.S. politics, the survey examines how much this polarization is present within the Indian American community as well. The October 2020 IAAS study found that Indian Americans who identify as Democrats rate the Republican Party and former president Donald Trump very unfavorably.44 Republicans, for their part, view the Democrats, current President Joe Biden, and Vice President Kamala Harris in equally unfavorable terms. However, whereas the earlier data looked at political leaders and organizations, this section reviews interpersonal attitudes. The data described below unambiguously reveal a high degree of polarization, although its structure is asymmetric.
The key takeaway is that Republicans are more comfortable having close friends who are Democrats than the converse (see figure 23). Fifty-four percent of Republicans say they are very comfortable having Democratic friends. Thirty-six percent say they are somewhat comfortable and 10 percent say they are not comfortable at all.
Democrats, however, are more strident in their views toward individuals from the other party. Just 27 percent say they are very comfortable having Republican friends—half the number of Republicans who feel that way toward Democrats. Fifty-one percent of Democrats say they are somewhat comfortable with Republican friends and 22 percent say they are not comfortable (more than twice the number of Republicans who felt that way about Democrats). The survey’s findings are notable in this regard because previous research on polarization among the American general public has generally found that Republicans, not Democrats, possess greater antipathy toward members of the other party.45
Indian Americans who have no allegiance to either major party hold slightly asymmetric views as well. They are more likely to say they are very comfortable having Democratic than Republican friends, and three times as many say they would not be comfortable having close Republican friends than close Democratic friends.
PARTISAN SUPPORT IN INDIA
The February 2021 IAAS study found several indications that polarization in India had successfully metastasized in the Indian American community in the United States. Religious differences, in particular, have emerged as a salient divide both in India and among members of the diaspora. This paper explores a different cleavage—partisan affiliation in India—by examining how Indian Americans who favor the Congress or the BJP view supporters of the other party.
As with political parties in the American context, there is a certain degree of asymmetric polarization as far as supporters of the Congress and the BJP are concerned, although both groups are generally more hostile toward supporters of the opposing Indian party than is true in the analogous case of Republicans and Democrats (see figure 24).
Thirty percent of Congress supporters are not comfortable having close friends who support the BJP; this is double the share of BJP supporters who are uncomfortable having close friends who are Congress supporters. Thirty-seven percent of Congress supporters are somewhat comfortable having friends who support the BJP (identical to the share of BJP supporters who are somewhat comfortable having Congress friends), but just 23 percent say they are very comfortable having BJP supporters as friends (for BJP supporters, the analogous share is 35 percent).
Respondents who support neither the BJP nor the Congress—listed as “Other”—appear more favorably inclined toward the Congress. Nineteen percent of them are not comfortable having close friends associated with the BJP. Just 9 percent of them hold the same views vis-à-vis the Congress. This too mirrors the American political context, where supporters of smaller parties or those who are unaffiliated hold more favorable views toward Democrats.46
These findings raise two questions worthy of further exploration: Why does political polarization among Indian Americans differ from that characterizing Americans at large? And to what extent are these differences being driven by political polarization in the country of origin (in this case, India)? Immigrants often import social norms from their home countries to their newly adopted homes. However, their political views in the latter might also be influenced by politics in their country of origin. These views, in turn, are further affected both by selection effects (who emigrates) and political dynamics in the country of settlement.
DISCRIMINATION
This section reviews respondents’ views on discrimination against Indian Americans. It explores this contentious subject in three ways. First, the survey asks respondents to consider how discrimination against Indian Americans compares to discrimination directed toward other minority communities in the United States. Second, the survey asks respondents about their own lived experience with discrimination. Finally, the survey examines the identity of the person(s) responsible for engaging in discriminatory behavior.
PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
In the last few years, there has been much greater recognition of the discrimination faced by minority groups in the United States. For instance, a March 2020 Pew survey found that 79 percent of Americans agree that there is a lot or some discrimination against African Americans. Seventy-six percent believe there is a similar degree of discrimination against Hispanic people, while 71 percent say the same about discrimination against people of Asian origin.47
The IAAS survey first asks respondents if they think discrimination against people of Indian origin is a major problem. Thirty-one percent respond that it is a major problem, 53 percent believe it is a minor problem, and a small minority (17 percent) believe it is not a problem at all.
One way to understand the dynamics of discrimination at play is to place discrimination against Indian Americans in a comparative context. The survey asks respondents whether they believe other minorities experience a greater degree of discrimination relative to Indian Americans (see figure 25).
A narrow majority—52 percent—of respondents believe that people in the United States discriminate more against all of the other minority groups listed than they do against Indian Americans. That means just less than half of all respondents believe that Indian Americans face a greater degree of discrimination than at least one other minority group. Seventy-three percent of respondents believe that Asian Americans who are not of Indian origin face more discrimination than Indian Americans. Much larger shares believe that other minority groups face greater discrimination than Indian Americans, including Latino Americans (90 percent), LGBTQ Americans (89 percent), African Americans (86 percent), and women (86 percent).
EXPERIENCE WITH DISCRIMINATION
In addition, the survey asks respondents whether, in the last twelve months, they have personally felt discriminated against. To broaden the aperture, the survey asks about discrimination along several dimensions beyond country of origin: skin color, gender, religion, and caste.
The data in figure 26 show that one in two Indian Americans reports being subject to some form of discrimination in the past year. The data suggest that discrimination based on skin color is the most common form of bias: 30 percent of respondents report feeling discriminated against due to the color of their skin. An equal percentage of respondents—18 percent apiece—report that they have been discriminated against due to their gender or religion.
Muslims report the greatest degree of religious discrimination by far (39 percent), followed by Hindus (18 percent), Christians (15 percent), and believers of other faiths (9 percent). Sixteen percent of Indian Americans report being discriminated against by virtue of their Indian heritage. And, finally, 5 percent of all respondents report having encountered discrimination due to their caste identity.
When it comes to discrimination experienced by Indian Americans, a significantly larger share of foreign-born Indian Americans (59 percent) state that they have not been discriminated against on any grounds in the past year, compared to just 36 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans (see figure 27).
Both U.S.- and foreign-born Indian Americans report significant discrimination based on skin color—35 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Interestingly, respondents born in the United States report twice as much discrimination along gender and religious lines than those born outside of the United States. Reported discrimination based on country of origin and caste is roughly similar for both groups (around 15–16 and 5–6 percent, respectively). The heightened levels of discrimination that U.S.-born respondents report compared to immigrants hold true across categories—whether skin color, gender, religion, or even caste. Although the latter difference in perceptions of caste discrimination is tiny, it is nonetheless interesting given the lower degree of caste consciousness among U.S.-born Indian Americans.
One might expect that foreign-born respondents might face greater discrimination given that they are more likely to bear obvious markers that tie them to India (such as accents or dress). However, the results point in the opposite direction. There are a host of plausible reasons why U.S.-born Indian Americans might report greater discrimination, including differences in social norms, greater awareness of discriminatory practices, or less fear of retaliation.48
¿DISCRIMINACIÓN POR QUIÉN?
Si la mitad de todos los indios americanos reportan alguna forma de discriminación, esto plantea la pregunta: ¿Quién los está discriminando? Para los encuestados que experimentaron discriminación, la encuesta pregunta si los perpetradores de la discriminación fueron indios, no indios o ambos (véase la figura 28).
Algunos hallazgos merecen atención. En primer lugar, los encuestados culpan abrumadoramente a los no indios cuando se trata de discriminación sobre la base del país de origen o el color de la piel. En ambos casos, aproximadamente tres cuartas partes de los perpetradores fueron identificados como no indios. En aproximadamente una quinta parte de los casos, tanto los indios como los no indios fueron percibidos como corresponsables.
En segundo lugar, si bien los encuestados sugieren que los indios tienen una responsabilidad algo mayor por participar en prácticas discriminatorias a lo largo de las líneas de religión y género, aquí también señalan principalmente a los no indios o una combinación de indios y no indios como fuentes primarias de discriminación.
En tercer lugar, la discriminación de castas es una ofensa sorprendentemente igualitaria de oportunidades. Las respuestas se dividen perfectamente en tercios cuando se trata de quién está discriminando: los indios, los no indios y las personas de ambas categorías son casi igualmente culpables.49
¿Cómo podrían los no indios discriminar a los indios sobre la base de la casta si la casta no es una categoría destacada para ellos? Este es un verdadero rompecabezas. Una posibilidad es que la persona o personas que participan en la discriminación de castas puedan ser de otro país del asia meridional, donde la casta podría ser un marcador significativo de estatus y tener mayor relevancia.50 Otra posibilidad es que los encuestados interpreten la discriminación de casta como un sustituto de otras formas de discriminación, por ejemplo, sobre la base del color de la piel o el país de origen. Dado que solo el 5 por ciento de los encuestados de IAAS informan ser víctimas de discriminación de castas, cualquier análisis de subgrupos debe interpretarse con el debido cuidado dado el pequeño tamaño de la muestra involucrado.
COMUNIDAD INDIO AMERICANA
Esta sección final examina cómo los encuestados se relacionan con la comunidad indígena americana. Se centra en tres temas: la membresía en organizaciones indio-americanas, las divisiones dentro de la comunidad indio-americana (y los impulsores de esas divisiones), y el papel que desempeña la comunidad indio-americana en las relaciones entre Estados Unidos e India.
MEMBERSHIP IN INDIAN AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS
The survey asks respondents if they are a member of any Indian American organization or group, such as a cultural, regional, religious, caste, community, or school-based organization. Overall, one-third of respondents report membership in an Indian American organization. While this does not necessarily mean that two-thirds of Indian Americans are disconnected from their community, it does suggest that formal participation is somewhat limited. Forty percent of respondents born in the United States report being a member of an Indian American organization, compared to 29 percent of those born elsewhere.
DIVISIONS WITHIN THE INDIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
The survey furthers asks respondents to assess whether they believe that domestic politics in India might be creating or exacerbating divisions within the Indian American community. Responses are very divided. Twenty-eight percent respond in the affirmative—that political divisions in India are infecting dynamics within the Indian community in the United States. But this remains a minority view: 40 percent of Indian Americans do not believe that domestic politics are dividing the Indian diaspora in the United States. Fully one-third of respondents—a large proportion—do not express an opinion either way.
For the 28 percent of respondents who perceive that polarization in India is impacting the diaspora community, the survey asks what specific features of India’s domestic politics are responsible (see figure 29). (Respondents can select multiple choices from a preselected menu of options, so the percentages in the figure do not add up to 100.)
As the figure demonstrates, religion leads the way—59 percent of Indian Americans believe it is responsible for creating internal divisions in the community. But religion only narrowly edges out the role of India’s political leadership (56 percent) for the top spot, and political parties (47 percent) are not far behind. Rounding out the list are caste (35 percent), economic policy (29 percent), and language (24 percent). One percent of respondents point to some other factor.
To a certain extent, however, many of these factors are inseparable. For instance, for Indian Americans who skeptically view the rise of Hindu majoritarianism in India, it is unclear how they might apportion blame given that religion, leadership, and political parties are all deeply intertwined, especially in the current political scenario. Although Indian Americans born in the United States assess India’s present trajectory more critically than those born outside of the United States—a finding the February 2021 IAAS study established 51—the latter are somewhat more likely to blame religion (62 percent versus 55 percent) as well as political leadership (61 percent versus 48 percent).
ROLE OF THE INDIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
Where does this leave the Indian American community and its role in promoting U.S.-India relations? After all, for more than two decades, the Indian diaspora in the United States has been a critical bridge-builder between the two countries.52 But with divisions in the community more apparent and increasingly linked to political disputes in India, we have suggested elsewhere that the diaspora’s unity of purpose could suffer a setback.53
As a final step, the survey asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “Overall, the Indian American community has a positive impact on U.S.-India relations.” As of now, the community is quite bullish about the diaspora’s achievements in this regard. Seventy percent state that they strongly or somewhat agree with the statement. A very small minority, around 10 percent, strongly or somewhat disagrees. Around 21 percent express no opinion either way. This suggests that the evidence of polarization, while real, should not be overinterpreted either.
CONCLUSION
Más de medio siglo después de la aprobación de la histórica Ley de Inmigración y Nacionalidad de 1965, que permitió una nueva ola de migración india a los Estados Unidos, la comunidad indígena americana ha alcanzado la mayoría de edad. Su tamaño en rápido crecimiento, su éxito económico y su creciente visibilidad política le han dado una mayor prominencia en la vida estadounidense. En muchos sentidos, la comunidad a menudo es retratada como el ejemplo de la apertura histórica de Estados Unidos a los nuevos inmigrantes que, en formas grandes y pequeñas, han transformado el país.
Pero esa misma visibilidad también invita a un mayor escrutinio, arrojando luz sobre las tensiones dentro de la comunidad. Este documento argumenta que si bien hay mucho que une a la comunidad, también hay señales incipientes de que estos lazos comunes se están probando a medida que las divisiones religiosas, las divisiones generacionales y la polarización política invitan a la fragmentación. En ese sentido, las corrientes que se abren paso a través de la diáspora india tal vez reflejen no solo los desarrollos más amplios en la sociedad estadounidense, sino también, y tal vez incluso en mayor medida, la turbulencia que aflige a la India.
En el momento de escribir este artículo, India se tambalea bajo un resurgimiento devastador del coronavirus. Los miembros de la comunidad indígena americana, tanto individual como colectivamente, se están movilizando en respuesta. Motivados por sus lazos emocionales con la India, así como por sus derechos y responsabilidades como ciudadanos estadounidenses, los indios estadounidenses han empujado al gobierno de los Estados Unidos a montar una respuesta humanitaria a gran escala.54
Para los indios americanos, el pasado no es solo un país distante. Por el contrario, la India continúa existiendo en el presente, ya que influye en las vidas de la diáspora, incluso cuando sus miembros trazan un nuevo camino en su hogar adoptivo.
Este estudio es el tercero de una serie sobre las actitudes sociales, políticas y de política exterior de los indios americanos. Haga clic aquí para la segunda parte de esta serie, un examen de cómo los indios americanos ven la política india, y haga clic aquí para la primera parte de la serie, que explora cómo los indios americanos ven la política estadounidense.
APÉNDICE A: METODOLOGÍA
Los encuestados para esta encuesta fueron reclutados de un panel existente administrado por YouGov. YouGov mantiene un panel de encuesta patentado y doble opt-in compuesto por 1.8 millones de residentes de los Estados Unidos que han aceptado participar en las encuestas de YouGov.
ENCUESTAS DE PANEL EN LÍNEA
Los paneles en línea no son lo mismo que las encuestas tradicionales basadas en la probabilidad. Sin embargo, gracias a la disminución de las tasas de respuesta, el aumento de la penetración de Internet y los teléfonos inteligentes, y la evolución de las técnicas estadísticas, los paneles de no reproducibilidad, como el que emplea YouGov, se han convertido rápidamente en la norma en la investigación de encuestas.55 For instance, the Economist partnered with YouGov to track political attitudes around the November 2020 U.S. presidential election using a customized panel.56
RESPONDENT SELECTION AND SAMPLING DESIGN
Los datos para esta encuesta se basan en una encuesta única de 1.200 adultos de origen indio realizada entre el 1 y el 20 de septiembre de 2020. Para proporcionar una imagen precisa de la comunidad indígena americana en su conjunto, la muestra completa contiene tanto ciudadanos estadounidenses como ciudadanos no estadounidenses. Dado el hecho de que la mayoría de los indios estadounidenses más jóvenes menores de veintisiete años nacen en los Estados Unidos, mientras que lo contrario es cierto para los mayores de veintisiete años, YouGov sobremuestreó a los indios estadounidenses más jóvenes entre las edades de dieciocho y veintisiete años para garantizar que los análisis del estudio puedan hacer inferencias sobre las diferencias generacionales dentro de la comunidad indio-americana.
COINCIDENCIA DE MUESTRAS
Para producir el conjunto de datos final, los encuestados fueron emparejados con un marco de muestreo sobre género, edad y educación. La muestra principal se emparejó con un marco correspondiente a todos los indios americanos adultos, y la sobremuestra se emparejó con un marco correspondiente a los indios americanos de dieciocho a veintisiete años. Ambos marcos se construyeron mediante muestreo estratificado a partir de la muestra completa de un año de ACS 2018. Dentro de los estratos, las coincidencias se seleccionaron mediante muestreo ponderado con reemplazos (utilizando los pesos de las personas en el archivo de uso público de ACS).
Los casos emparejados se ponderaron en los marcos de muestreo utilizando puntuaciones de propensión. Se combinaron los casos emparejados y los marcos, y se estimó una regresión logística para su inclusión en los marcos. La función de puntuación de propensión incluyó edad, sexo, años de educación y región. Las puntuaciones de propensión se agruparon en deciles de la puntuación de propensión estimada en los fotogramas y se postestratificaron de acuerdo con estos deciles.57
Los pesos de muestreo se estratificaron posteriormente en la elección del voto presidencial de 2016, así como una estratificación a tres bandas de género, edad (cuatro categorías) y educación (cuatro categorías), para producir el peso final.
ANÁLISIS DE DATOS Y FUENTES DE ERROR
Todos los análisis de este estudio se realizaron utilizando el software estadístico R y emplean ponderaciones de muestra para garantizar la representatividad.
El margen de error para la muestra completa de 1.200 encuestados es de +/- 2,8 por ciento. Este margen de error se calcula en el intervalo de confianza del 95 por ciento.
La Figura 30 proporciona la distribución geográfica de los encuestados por estado de residencia.
APÉNDICE B: TOPLINE DE LA ENCUESTA
Para obtener los resultados completos de la encuesta, visite el Apéndice B aquí.
RECONOCIMIENTOS
We would like to acknowledge numerous individuals and organizations for making this study possible. We are grateful to Tobin Hansen of Carnegie for his assistance with the design and the analysis of the survey.
We are grateful to Ashley Grosse, Alexander Marsolais, and their colleagues at YouGov for their help with the design and execution of the survey.
We are grateful to the team at the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania. This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board (Protocol #843855).
En Carnegie, debemos un agradecimiento especial a Samuel Brase y Cooper Hewell por su asistencia editorial. También nos gustaría agradecer a Amy Mellon por contribuir con sus considerables talentos de diseño gráfico. Douglas Farrar, Cliff Djajapranata, Fiona Garguilo, Jessica Katz, Laura Lucas Magnuson, Lori Merritt, Tim Martin, Jocelyn Soly y Cameron Zotter contribuyeron con asistencia de diseño, editorial y producción.
Si bien estamos agradecidos con todos nuestros colaboradores, cualquier error encontrado en este estudio es completamente de los autores.
SOBRE LOS AUTORES
Sumitra Badrinathan es investigadora postdoctoral en el Instituto Reuters para el Estudio del Periodismo de la Universidad de Oxford. Estudia la desinformación, los efectos de los medios y el comportamiento político y emplea métodos de encuesta y experimentales en su trabajo. Tiene un doctorado en ciencias políticas de la Universidad de Pensilvania.
Devesh Kapur es profesor de Estudios del Sur de Asia de la Fundación Starr y director de Programas de Asia en la Escuela Johns Hopkins de Estudios Internacionales Avanzados (SAIS). Es autor de varios libros, incluyendo Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Impact of International Migration from India on India y The Other One Percent: Indians in America (con Sanjoy Chakravorty y Nirvikar Singh).
Jonathan Kay es becario junior James C. Gaither en el Programa de Asia meridional de la Fundación Carnegie para la Paz Internacional.
Milan Vaishnav es miembro principal y director del Programa de Asia Meridional en el Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Es autor de When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics y presenta un podcast semanal de Carnegie sobre política y política india, Grand Tamasha.
NOTAS
1 "Comentarios del presidente Biden en una llamada para felicitar al equipo de perseverancia del JPL de la NASA por el exitoso aterrizaje en Marte", Casa Blanca, 4 de marzo de 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/04/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-call-to-congratulate-the-nasa-jpl-perseverance-team-on-the-successful-mars-landing/.
2 Ibídem.
3 Immigration Commission, U.S. Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission 349 (1911) citado en Sherally Munshi, "Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies of Indian Exclusion", Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 28, no. 1 (2015): 51–104. En ese momento, la mayoría de los inmigrantes de lo que entonces era la India británica eran de hecho sijs, no hindúes.
4 Sanjoy Chakravorty, Devesh Kapur y Nirvikar Singh, The Other One Percent: Indians in America (Nueva York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
5 Devesh Kapur y Jashan Bajwa, "A Study of Poverty in the Indian American Population", Johns Hopkins-SAIS, octubre de 2020, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qCf6RE2L2FpvA6mny2Y_Xtof_zdJpFdC/view.
6 "Estimaciones de la población inmigrante no autorizada que reside en los Estados Unidos: enero de 2015-enero de 2018", Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de los Estados Unidos, enero de 2021, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/Pop_Estimate/UnauthImmigrant/unauthorized_immigrant_population_estimates_2015_-_2018.pdf.
7 El término "dalit" se refiere a los individuos que ocupan los peldaños más bajos de la jerarquía de castas hindú tradicional. Formalmente, los miembros de este grupo se conocen como "Castas Programadas". Saritha Rai, "How Big Tech Is Importing India's Caste Legacy to Silicon Valley", Bloomberg, 11 de marzo de 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-03-11/how-big-tech-is-importing-india-s-caste-legacy-to-silicon-valley?sref=QmOxnLFz.
8 Véase, entre otros, Thenmozhi Soundararajan, "A New Lawsuit Shines a Light on Caste Discrimination in the U.S. and Around the World", Washington Post, 13 de julio de 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/13/new-lawsuit-shines-light-caste-discrimination-us-around-world/; y Yashica Dutt, "The Spectre of Caste in Silicon Valley", New York Times, 14 de julio de 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/opinion/caste-cisco-indian-americans-discrimination.html.
9 Nicole Hong y Jonah E. Bromwich, "Los asiático-americanos están siendo atacados. ¿Por qué son tan raros los cargos por delitos de odio?", New York Times, 18 de marzo de 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/nyregion/asian-hate-crimes.html.
10 Anna Purna Kambhampaty, "En el momento del censo, los estadounidenses de origen asiático vuelven a enfrentar la pregunta de quién 'cuenta' como asiático. Así es como la respuesta se volvió tan complicada", Time, 12 de marzo de 2020, https://time.com/5800209/asian-american-census/.
11 Chakravorty, Kapur y Singh, el otro uno por ciento, 178. Desde 1980, el Censo de los Estados Unidos ha categorizado a los indios como "indios asiáticos", un subconjunto de la categoría racial "asiática".
12 Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur y Milan Vaishnav, "¿Cómo votarán los indios americanos? Resultados de la Encuesta de Actitudes de los Indios Americanos de 2020", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 de octubre de 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/14/how-will-indian-americans-vote-results-from-2020-indian-american-attitudes-survey-pub-82929.
13Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur y Milan Vaishnav, "¿Cómo ven los indios americanos la India? Resultados de la Encuesta de Actitudes de los Indios Americanos de 2020", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 de febrero de 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/02/09/how-do-indian-americans-view-india-results-from-2020-indian-american-attitudes-survey-pub-83800.
14 Mary Hanna y Jeanne Batalova, "Inmigrantes indios en los Estados Unidos", Migration Policy Institute, 16 de octubre de 2020, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states-2019.
15 Si bien este estudio informa los tamaños de la muestra como totales brutos, todos los análisis incluyen pesos de muestreo, lo que significa que las proporciones y los medios discutidos aquí se ponderan, a menos que se indique lo contrario.
16 De los nacidos fuera de los Estados Unidos, el 80 por ciento nacieron en la India. Otro 6 por ciento nació en Bangladesh o Pakistán. El resto de la muestra proviene de una variedad de países que se extienden desde el Reino Unido hasta Trinidad y Tobago y Kenia.
17 Esto se compara con el 60 por ciento según los datos de la ACS 2018.
18 Un 5 por ciento adicional de los encuestados informan que no tienen una tarjeta OCI o no están seguros de su estado OCI.
19 Chakravorty, Kapur y Singh, El otro uno por ciento, tabla 2.2 y figura 2.4.
20 Según la ACS de 2018, el 73 por ciento de los hogares indios asiáticos son hogares de parejas casadas en comparación con el promedio nacional del 48 por ciento.
21 Chakravorty, Kapur y Singh, El otro uno por ciento, tabla 4.4 y figura 4.14.
22 No existe una correspondencia uno a uno entre el hindi y un estado de origen indio, ya que el idioma se habla en una amplia franja de estados, especialmente, pero no exclusivamente, en el norte y centro de la India. Según el Censo Indio de 2011, la distribución de la población india por idioma fue la siguiente: hindi (44 por ciento), bengalí (8 por ciento), telugu (7 por ciento), marathi (7 por ciento), tamil (6 por ciento), gujarati (5 por ciento), kannada (4 por ciento), urdu (4 por ciento), punjabi (3 por ciento) y malayalam (3 por ciento). Oficina del Registrador General de la India, "Idioma: Estados indios y territorios de la Unión (cuadro C-16)", Censo de la India 2011, documento 1 (2018), https://censusindia.gov.in/2011Census/C-16_25062018_NEW.pdf.
23 "America's Changing Religious Landscape", Pew Research Center, 12 de mayo de 2015, https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/.
24 Christine Tamir, Aidan Connaughton y Ariana Monique Salazar, "The Global God Divide", Pew Research Center, 20 de julio de 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/20/the-global-god-divide/.
25 "Measuring Religion in Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel", Pew Research Center, 14 de enero de 2021, https://www.pewforum.org/2021/01/14/measuring-religion-in-pew-research-centers-american-trends-panel/.
26 Ibídem.
27 Hay una variación significativa en la frecuencia de la oración basada en la edad de los encuestados. Cincuenta y uno por ciento de los encuestados que tienen cincuenta años o más informan orar una vez al día o varias veces al día, en comparación con solo el 29 por ciento de los encuestados entre las edades de dieciocho y veintinueve años.
28 Dutt, "El espectro de la casta en Silicon Valley"; Jennifer Medina, "Debate Erupts in California Over Curriculum on India's History", New York Times, 4 de mayo de 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/us/debate-erupts-over-californias-india-history-curriculum.html.
29 Maari Zwick-Maitreyi, Thenmozhi Soundararajan, Natasha Dar, Ralph F. Bheel y Prathap Balakrishnan, Caste in the United States: A Survey of Caste Among South Asian Americans (Igualdad Labs, 2018). Este estudio se basó en un método de muestreo de bola de nieve no representativo para reclutar a los encuestados. Además, los encuestados que no revelaron una identidad de casta fueron eliminados del conjunto de datos. Por lo tanto, es probable que la muestra no represente completamente a la población sudasiática americana y podría inclinarse a favor de aquellos que tienen fuertes puntos de vista sobre la casta. Si bien la existencia de discriminación de castas en la India es incontrovertible, su alcance e intensidad precisos en los Estados Unidos pueden ser cuestionadas.
30 Para una visión general del debate sobre las categorías de castas en el Islam en el sur de Asia, véase Julien Levesque, "Debates sobre la casta musulmana en el norte de la India y Pakistán: de la etnografía colonial a la movilización de Pasmanda", Institut Francais de Pondichery y Centre de Sciences Humaines, 1 de junio de 2020, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02697381/document.
31 Los encuestados más ricos y educados tienen más probabilidades de identificarse con un grupo de castas. Treinta y seis por ciento de los hindúes con un ingreso familiar inferior a $ 50,000 se identifican con la casta, pero esa proporción aumenta al 50 por ciento entre los hogares que ganan entre $ 50,000 y $ 100,000 y el 52 por ciento para los que superan los $ 100,000. En términos de logros educativos, el 48 por ciento de los hindúes con una educación de pregrado profesan una identificación de casta en comparación con el 43 por ciento con menos de un título universitario de cuatro años.
32 Esta última cifra podría ser aún mayor si hay quienes consideran que su identidad india es tan poco importante que no se autoidentifican como una persona de origen indio (asiático) en el panel de YouGov para empezar.
33 También se podría esperar una variación basada en la edad de un encuestado. Un análisis más detallado muestra que tanto la edad como la duración de la estadía en los Estados Unidos son importantes. Los jóvenes dan menos importancia a ser indios, incluso después de controlar durante cuánto tiempo han estado en los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, la duración de la estancia sigue siendo significativa.
34 Badrinathan, Kapur y Vaishnav, "How Do Indian Americans View India?", págs. 20–22.
35 Si bien esto puede parecer contradictorio, este hallazgo se explica por el hecho de que los encuestados nacidos en los Estados Unidos son significativamente más propensos a identificarse como más estadounidenses que indios.
36 Una encuesta de Pew de noviembre de 2020 de votantes estadounidenses encontró que el 36 por ciento de los encuestados demostró apoyo a un candidato en las redes sociales, una cuarta parte contribuyó con dinero a una campaña política, el 10 por ciento dijo que asistió a un mitin político virtual o evento de campaña en línea, y el 6 por ciento asistió a un evento de campaña en línea. Andrew Daniller y Hannah Gilberstadt, "Hallazgos clave sobre la participación de los votantes en las elecciones de 2020", Pew Research Center, 14 de diciembre de 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/14/key-findings-about-voter-engagement-in-the-2020-election/.
37 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Integration of Immigrants into American Society (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2015).
38 Badrinathan, Kapur y Vaishnav, "¿Cómo ven los indios americanos la India?", págs. 12–13.
39 Este hallazgo se mantiene incluso si usamos una medida binaria de la concentración de indios americanos, utilizando un límite del dos por ciento de la población de un país; abandonar condados atípicos con concentraciones inusualmente altas de indios americanos; control del número total de hogares en un condado; y el control del lugar de nacimiento del encuestado.
40 Curiosamente, la composición de origen indio de las redes sociales no varía significativamente según la edad de los encuestados.
41 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin y James M. Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks", Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 415–444.
42 Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood e Yphtach Lelkes, "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization", Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2012): 405–431; Matthew Levendusky y Neil Malhotra, "¿La cobertura mediática de la polarización partidista afecta las actitudes políticas?", Political Communication 33, no. 2 (2016): 283–301.
43 La encuesta pregunta a los encuestados qué tan cómodos se sentirían teniendo amigos cercanos de diversos orígenes. La encuesta también pregunta a los encuestados qué tan cómodos se sentirían si un hijo / hija se casara con alguien de un entorno particular. Debido a que los resultados son en gran medida los mismos, este estudio solo informa los resultados del primero.
44 Badrinathan, Kapur y Vaishnav, "¿Cómo votarán los indios americanos?", págs. 16–17.
45 Carroll Doherty, "¿Qué partido tiene más culpa de la polarización política? Depende de la medida", Pew Research Center, 17 de junio de 2014, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/17/which-party-is-more-to-blame-for-political-polarization-it-depends-on-the-measure/.
46 Dado lo polarizadas que son las opiniones de Modi y el hecho de que se ha convertido en sinónimo del BJP, es posible que, al igual que Trump y el contexto estadounidense, la asimetría en la distancia social pueda ser un producto del liderazgo actual del BJP.
47 Andrew Daniller, "La mayoría de los estadounidenses ven al menos cierta discriminación contra las personas negras, hispanas y asiáticas en los Estados Unidos", Pew Research Center, 18 de marzo de 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/03/18/majorities-of-americans-see-at-least-some-discrimination-against-black-hispanic-and-asian-people-in-the-u-s/.
48 Mellini Kantayya, "Hank Azaria se disculpó por interpretar a Apu en 'Los Simpson'. Acepto", Washington Post, 22 de abril de 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/22/hank-azaria-apologized-playing-apu-i-accept-i-appreciate-it/.
49 Aunque el tamaño de la muestra es extremadamente pequeño, parece que los encuestados hindúes que se identifican afirmativamente con una casta tienen más probabilidades de denunciar discriminación por motivos de casta.
50 Surinder S. Jodhka y Ghanshyam Shah, "Comparative Contexts of Discrimination: Caste and Untouchability in South Asia", Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 48 (2010): 99–106.
51 Badrinathan, Kapur y Vaishnav, "¿Cómo ven los indios americanos a la India?"
52 Arthur G. Rubinoff, "The Diaspora as a Factor in U.S.-India Relations", Asian Affairs: An American Review 32, no. 3 (2005): 169–187.
53 Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur y Milan Vaishnav, "On India, A Fracture in the Diaspora", Hindustan Times, 10 de febrero de 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/on-india-a-fracture-in-the-diaspora-101612878777662.html.
54 Devesh Kapur, "El poder de los indios en el extranjero", Foreign Policy, 13 de mayo de 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/13/the-power-of-indians-abroad/.
55 Para una introducción accesible a este método de encuesta, véase Courtney Kennedy et al., "Evaluating Online Nonprobability Surveys", Pew Research Center, 2 de mayo de 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2016/05/02/evaluating-online-nonprobability-surveys/. Según YouGov, su panel superó a sus competidores evaluados en este estudio de Pew. Véase Doug Rivers, "Pew Research: YouGov Consistentemente supera a los competidores en precisión", YouGov, 13 de mayo de 2016, https://today.yougov.com/topics/finance/articles-reports/2016/05/13/pew-research-yougov.
56 Para encontrar detalles sobre la colaboración Economist-YouGov o para comparar algunos de los hallazgos de IAAS sobre los indios americanos con la población estadounidense en general, visite https://today.yougov.com/topics/economist/survey-results.
57 Para la intuición metodológica detrás de este enfoque, véase Douglas Rivers y Delia Bailey, "Inference From Matching Samples in the 2008 U.S. National Elections", Proceedings of the Survey Research Methods Section of the American Statistical Association 2009, http://www.asasrms.org/Proceedings/y2009/Files/303309.pdf.
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